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From Tactical to Strategic Deception Detection: Application of
Psychological Synthesis
Abstract
Deception detection has ubiquitously focussed upon detecting deceit in the individual,
whether in national security, forensic or business-related environments. In contrast an
understanding of how to identify deception committed by multiple individuals or groups
challenging strategic interests has been neglected. In this article - to enhance
understanding of practitioners working across security, intelligence and forensic areas - a
process of psychological synthesis is advocated. Psychological synthesis incorporates a
multitude of approaches reflecting contextual requirements towards deception detection
across verbal/linguistic behavior, non-verbal behavior, online interactions and intelligence
analysis approaches. These combined with in-depth understanding of individuals’ cultures,
personality and manner of presentation can be understood in challenging environments.
Juxtaposed to these factors psychological synthesis considers how intelligence, surveillance
and evidence may be used in detecting deception and identifying links between individuals
engaging in deception and related activities. An illustration of how such an approach may
work is provided through a scenario of a terrorist incident and how a tailored deception
detection approach may seek to counter such a threat.

This article is available in Journal of Strategic Security: https://digitalcommons.usf.edu/jss/vol10/iss1/
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Introduction
Deception occurs across tactical and strategic environments presenting
challenges within forensic and security domains. Tactical forms of deception are
associated with individual acts and occur across multiple contexts, while strategic
forms are part of larger operations targeting organizations and infrastructure.1
Deception is proposed to comprise of simulation and dissimulation.2 Simulation
is considered to be showing false information to the target through mimicking,
inventing, and decoying strategies.3 Mimicking tactics seek to deceive the target
through imitating reality, inventing tactics create something new, which is false,
and decoying tactics deceive the target through diverting attention to another
area.4 Dissimulation means to deceive the target through hiding information by
masking, repackaging, and dazzling tactics.5 Masking aims to hide information
by making it invisible to detection, repackaging hides reality through disguising
and modifying appearance, and dazzling hides reality through presenting a range
of options to blur reality in sense-making.6
In contrast to strategic and military deception, psychological approaches to
deception have focused primarily on detecting deception in individuals rather
than conducting deception operations against adversaries. Psychological theories
of individual-level deception detection have focused either upon isolated cues to
deception that are uncovered passively through examining behavior or more
recent active interviewing approaches which aim to elicit cues to deception. Both
passive and active approaches have targeted assessments of veracity towards
individuals who may pose a threat across criminal and security related
environments. These approaches may prove useful in detecting deception in
individual cases; however, if individuals are part of a larger deception then
additional challenges in uncovering deception will occur. Such challenges relate
to deception conducted by a variety of actors covering both state and non-state
groups, proxies and loosely aligned collectives. This article examines deception
detection approaches across strategic environments, historical and current
approaches to verbal, non-verbal, and online individual interactions. It advocates
a focus towards how such approaches, combined with understanding the motives
William Glenney, “Military deception in the information age: Scale matters,” in Brooke
Harrington (ed.), Deception: From Ancient Empires to Internet Dating (Stanford: Stanford
University Press, 2009), 254-274.
2 J. Bowyer Bell, “Toward a theory of deception,” International Journal of Intelligence and
Counterintelligence 16 (2003): 244,279; Whaley, Barton, “Toward a general theory of
deception,” Journal of Strategic Studies 5 (1982): 178-192.
3 Whaley, “Toward a general theory of deception.”
4 Bell, “Toward a theory of deception”; Macdonald, Scot, Propaganda and Information
Warfare in the Twenty-First Century: Altered Images and Deception Operations (London:
Routledge, 2004); Whaley, “Toward a general theory of deception.”
5 Whaley, “Toward a general theory of deception.”
6 Bell, “Toward a theory of deception”; Macdonald, Propaganda and Information Warfare in
the Twenty-First Century: Altered Images and Deception Operations; Whaley, “Toward a
general theory of deception.”
1
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and context behind deception collectively may be deployed against strategic level
deception. To illustrate how such approaches may combine, a scenario of a
terrorist incident is presented with potential strategies to how deception in such a
context may be detected.

Strategic Deception Detection
Strategic level deception is considered as deception that affects the critical
infrastructure, including management structures of organizations and such
deception may be wide-ranging or focused upon achieving specified goals.7 To
identify deception, there is a need for knowledge of the adversary alongside
strong intelligence and analysis of their behavior and patterns.8 Deception
detection may be passive and active.9 Passive deception detection consists of a
continual examination of reality seeking false patterns and hidden threats
alongside evidence of adversary deception planning.10 Active deception detection
consists of measures of identifying those who plan deception based upon their
background history or perceived future intentions.11 Counterpropaganda,
including disinformation, is a neglected area of focus within operating
environments. Current strategies are focused towards reactively identifying
adversary propaganda and how situational awareness is shaped rather than
proactively identifying counterpropaganda, which may mitigate threats.12
Deception may be detected through identifying elements of the deceiver’s plans.13
Identifying patterns involved in misdirection, identifying adversaries involved in
an operating environment, the intentions they may have, what the payoff or gain
may be, where the events take place, adversary strength, adversary style and the
information channel involved in communicating the deception.14 All of these
areas may highlight vulnerabilities in an adversary’s deception operation and in
turn may exploit the target if undetected.

Roy Godson and James Wirtz, “Strategic Denial and Deception,” in Roy Godson and James
Wirtz (eds.), Strategic Denial and Deception: The Twenty-First Century Challenge (London:
Transaction Publishers, 2002), 1-14; Abram Shulsky, “Elements of strategic denial and
deception,” in Roy Godson and James Wirtz (eds.), Strategic Denial and Deception: The
Twenty-First Century Challenge (London: Transaction Publishers, 2002), 15-33.
8 Christian Cali and Marc Romanych, “Counterpropaganda: An important capability for joint
forces,” IO Sphere (Fall, 2005): 11-13.
9 Bell, “Toward a theory of deception.”
10 Ibid.
11 Ibid.
12 Cali and Romanych, “Counterpropaganda: An important capability for joint forces”;
Godson, and Wirtz, “Strategic denial and deception.”
13 Bell, J. Bowyer, Cheating: Deception in War & Magic, Games & Sport, Sex & Religion,
Business & Con Games, Politics & Espionage, Art & Science (New York: St Martin’s Press,
1982); Barton Whaley and Jeffrey Busby, “Detecting deception: Practice, practitioners, and
theory,” in Roy Godson and James Wirtz (eds.), Strategic Denial and Deception: The TwentyFirst Century Challenge (London: Transaction Publishers, 2002), 181-221.
14 Ibid.
7
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Intelligence Approaches to Deception Detection
Approaches towards assessing intelligence and detecting deception include
Analysis of Competing Hypotheses (ACH), and techniques outlined by Barton
Whaley and Jeff Busby.15 Analysis of Competing Hypotheses (ACH) consists of a
series of steps firstly involving the identification of possible hypotheses. Second
evidence and assumptions are listed for and against each hypothesis. Third
tentative conclusions are drawn about the likelihood of each hypothesis,
including analysis of the sensitivity of the conclusion to significant evidence. Last,
the identification of future observations that would confirm or eliminate the
hypotheses is made.16 Analysis of Competing Hypotheses (ACH) has been applied
to historical incidents of deception including the D-Day landings and the Battle of
Midway.17 However, ACH may increase vulnerability to adversary deception
through weighing hypotheses upon evidence that may be false, and further
confirmation biases may occur if evidence fits with multiple hypotheses.18 To
counter confirmation biases and aid decision-making there should be an
increased emphasis on seeking refutations for hypotheses rather than
confirmations.19 Although ACH may appear as a promising method of supporting
decision-making processes involved in detecting deception, there is a need to
incorporate behavioral cues to deception.
Alternative analysis approaches including, ACH, have limitations in identifying
significant events, and advocated methods of testing alternatives have not been
regularly employed with frequent bias towards the most consistent alternative
even if there are potential incongruities.20 To enhance alternative analysis
approaches there is a requirement for:




increasing analytic imagination by testing many hypotheses;
independently check source vetting for increased accuracy in deception
detection;
the assessment of missing data to determine validity and check for denial
and;

Heuer, Richards, Psychology of Intelligence Analysis (Center for the Study of Intelligence,
1999); Karl Spielmann, “Strengthening intelligence threat analysis,” International Journal of
Intelligence and Counterintelligence 25 (2012): 19-43; Frank Stech, and Christopher Elsässer,
Deception Detection by Analysis of Competing Hypotheses, McLean, Virginia: The Mitre
Corporation, 2003; Stech, Frank, and Christopher Elsässer, Midway Revisited: Detecting
Deception by Analysis of Competing Hypothesis, Mclean, Virginia: The Mitre Corporation,
2004.
16 Stech, and Elsässer, Deception Detection by Analysis of Competing Hypotheses.
17 Ibid; Stech, and Elsässer, Midway Revisited: Detecting Deception by Analysis of
Competing Hypothesis.
18 Ibid.
19 Richards Heuer, “Limits of intelligence analysis,” Orbis 49 (2005): 75-94.
20 Spielmann, “Strengthening intelligence threat analysis.”
15
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make an unbiased assessment of the dominant views evidence and
reasoning.21

However, further synthesis is required to build upon psychological approaches to
deception detection as part of this process – particularly in building from an
individual’s deception to uncover strategic threats. Findings need further to be
made clear to practitioners and lay audiences.22
One proposed theory of counter-deception examines techniques employable
across multiple contexts.23 Nine categories of cues (pattern, players, intention,
payoff, place, time, strength, style, and channel) are argued to be elements that
the deceiver may conceal or reveal during deception. The major principle of this
approach is the ‘plus-minus rule’ where a series of the above characteristics may
indicate deception by their presence or absence.24 Real-world deception may not
enable clear differentiation as to a characteristics presence or absence and the
‘congruity-incongruity rule’ is advanced to suggest where incongruity occurs
deception maybe as well.25 Multiple techniques may be applied to deception
detection:










‘Locard’s exchange principle’–where a deceiver may leave evidence at the
scene and takes some away;
‘verification’–of the deception;
‘the law of multiple sensors’–examination of multiple channels for deceit;
‘passive and active detection’–the examination of current evidence and the
search for further evidence;
pre-detection–where understanding an adversary’s deception modus
operandi, goals and capabilities may uncover potential deception;
‘penetration and counterespionage’–uncovering an adversary’s plans
through espionage and neutralizing adversary operatives to protect target
infrastructure;
‘the prepared mind and intuition’–where preparation for deception and
the intuition to detect it enables counter-deception and;
‘indirect thinking and the third option’–the ability to detect potential
adversary options for deception is required for counter-deception.26

Ibid.
Karl Spielmann, “Using enhanced analytic techniques for threat analysis: A case study
illustration,” International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence 27 (2014): 132155.
23 Whaley, and Busby, “Detecting deception: Practice, practitioners, and theory.”
24 Ibid.
25 Ibid.
26 Ibid.
21

22
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One final element is the ‘Ombudsman Method’ where irrelevances, discrepancies,
and misdirection are examined alongside indirect thinking and intuition.27 This
approach to deception detection appears promising; however, there is a need for
the incorporation of psychological principles of deception detection and decisionmaking.
Bennett and Waltz’s counter-deception approach examines ‘intelligence
functions’ including deception cues, deception detection and exposure, adversary
discovery and penetration alongside ‘operational functions’ incorporating
mitigation and exploitation of adversary deception. These functions are argued to
be interdependent and present deception as a continuum rather than individual
elements.28 Human reasoning and self-assessment of own beliefs and methods of
intelligence gathering and intelligence-gathering channels will identify potential
vulnerabilities potentially mitigating the effects of deception.29 Multiple channels
of information should be used to ensure a greater range of human intelligence
(HUMINT) with which to assess credibility.30 Threat and situation assessments
are required to understand the influences and circumstances in which deception
may occur and such approaches parallel recent psychological approaches to
understanding high-stakes future intent. 31 Bennett and Waltz recommend
incongruity testing and ACH as tools for detecting deception, and combined with
psychological deception detection methods will enable a more accurate credibility
assessment.32

Tactical Deception Detection
Verbal Deception Detection
Verbal deception detection approaches focus upon examining statements,
typically derived from interviews or online content.33 Traditional approaches
have focused upon examining statements taken from interviews through
techniques including Statement Validity Analysis (SVA) and Reality Monitoring
(RM). Recent Differential Recall Enhancement (DRE) approaches seek to
increase the behavioral differences between truth-tellers and deceivers, whilst
Ibid.
Bennett, Michael, and Edward Waltz, Counterdeception Principles and Applications for
National Security (Artech House: London, 2007).
29 Ibid.
30 Ibid.
31 Ibid; Gozna, Lynsey, and Rebecca Lawday, “An applied scientist-practitioner model for the
assessment of high-stake deceptive future intent in forensic and security settings:
Incorporating critical consideration of personality, motive, mindet and risk,” poster presented
at DECEPTICON 2015: International Conference on Deceptive Behavior, University of
Cambridge, Cambridge, UK, August 24-26, 2015.
32 Bennett and Waltz, Counterdeception Principles and Applications for National Security.
33 Aldert Vrij, “Verbal lie detection tools: Statement validity analysis, reality monitoring and
scientific content analysis,” in Par Anders Granhag, Aldert Vrij and Brun0 Verschuere (eds.),
Detecting deception: Current challenges and cognitive approaches (Chichester: Wiley
Blackwell, 2015), 4-35.
27

28
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Forensic Statement Analysis and other linguistic analysis approaches have sought
to examine linguistic differences between truth-tellers and deceivers.34
Statement Validity Analysis (SVA) involves a review of relevant information, a
semi-structured interview, criteria-based content analysis (CBCA) and a Validity
Checklist to assess findings, focusing on behaviors that truth-tellers are more
likely to perform than deceivers do.35 In studies of CBCA, some criteria are
present more often and have more support in lie-truth discrimination. For
example, ‘unstructured production’ and ‘contextual embedding’ appear in more
than half of studies involving CBCA, whilst ‘self-deprecation’, ‘related external
associations’ and ‘pardoning the perpetrator’ appear in only a handful.36 Such
differences in the CBCA literature may in part reflect the studies being variously
conducted as field or laboratory research. There are limitations to SVA with
scoring, reliability of criteria, establishment of ground truth, lack of a
standardized training program, vulnerabilities to countermeasures and further
effects generated by culture, context, and personality.37
RM proposes that recollections of real experiences are developed from perceptual
processes whereas false experiences developed from our imagination will be
cognitive in nature enabling discrimination between truthful and deceptive
accounts.38 Reality Monitoring (RM) has shown similar levels of deception
Kevin Colwell, Cheryl Hiscock-Anisman, and Jacquelyn Fede, “Assessment criteria
indicative of deception: An example of the new paradigm of differential recall enhancement,”
in Barry Cooper, Dorothee Griesel and Marguerite Ternes (eds.), Applied Issues in
Investigative Interviewing, Eyewitness Memory, and Credibility Assessment (London:
Springer, 2013), 259-291; Charles Morgan, Kevin Colwell and Gary Hazlett, “Efficacy of
forensic statement analysis in distinguishing truthful from deceptive eyewitness accounts of
highly stressful events,” Journal of Forensic Sciences 56 (2011): 1227-1234; Charles Morgan,
Yaron Rabinowitz, Deborah Hilts, Craig Weller and Vladimir Coric, “Efficacy of Modified
Cognitive Interviewing, Compared to Human Judgments in Detecting Deception Related to
Bio-threat Activities,” Journal of Strategic Security 6 (2013): 100-119; Charles Morgan, Yaron
Rabinowitz, Robert Leidy and Vladimir Coric, “Efficacy of combining interview techniques in
detecting deception related to bio-threat issues,” Behavioral Sciences and the Law 32 (2014):
269-285; Charles Morgan, Yaron Rabinowitz, Beau Palin and Kirk Kennedy, “Who should
you trust? Discriminating genuine from deceptive eyewitness accounts,” The Open
Criminology Journal under review; Jeffrey Hancock, Lauren Curry, Saurabh Goorha and
Michael Woodworth, “On lying and being lied to: A linguistic analysis of deception in
computer-mediated communication,” Discourse Processes 45 (2008): 1-23; Matthew
Newman, James Pennebaker, Diane Berry and Jane Richards “Lying words: Predicting
deception from linguistic style,” Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin 29 (2003): 665675.
35 Vrij, “Verbal lie detection tools: Statement validity analysis, reality monitoring and
scientific content analysis.”
36 Stephen Porter and Leanne ten Brinke, “The truth about lies: What works in detecting highstakes deception?” Legal and Criminological Psychology 15 (2010): 57-75.
37 Aldert Vrij, “Criteria-based content analysis: A qualitative review of the first 37 studies,”
Psychology, Public Policy and Law 11 (2005): 3-41; Aldert Vrij, Wendy Kneller, and
Samantha Mann, “The effect of informing liars about criteria-based content analysis on their
ability to deceive CBCA-raters,” Legal and Criminological Psychology 5 (2000): 57-70.
38 Gary Bond and Adrienne Lee, “Language of lies in prison: Linguistic classification of
prisoners’ truthful and deceptive natural language,” Applied Cognitive Psychology 19 (2005):
213-329; Siegfried Sporer, “Reality monitoring and detection of deception,” in Par Anders
34
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detection accuracy and similar limitations to SVA while differences between real
and imagined events may fade over time and behavioral differences may actually
be due to interviewing techniques rather than RM.39
Differential Recall Enhancement (DRE) approaches focus on increasing
behavioral differences between liars and truth-tellers using cognitive mnemonics,
questioning strategy and use of evidence, for example, Assessment Criteria
Indicative of Deception (ACID), strategic use of evidence (SUE), and cognitive
approaches.40 Differential Recall Enhancement (DRE) is considered to assist
honest people in their recall and provides more detailed and verbose statements
whilst deceptive people work harder to maintain credibility and over-rely on
short, carefully constructed narratives.41 The mnemonic section of statements
can lead to an increase in accuracy of the order of 10-27 percent in veracity
assessment – suggesting that DRE techniques are useful for detecting deception
in investigative interviewing.42 DRE techniques may overcome the paucity of
valid cues to deception, although their application outside of interview specific
contexts will be limited. 43
The ACID technique analyses the admittance of potential errors, length of
responses and RM criteria associated with differences due to memory, impression
management, and unique contextual and internal/external details as they appear
during a police investigative interview.44 The Reality Interview (RI) increases an
interviewee’s cognitive load to elicit cues to deception and to challenge
impression management strategies.45 There is evidence that the ACID approach
can accurately classify 86.8 percent of statements (78.9 percent truthful and 94.7

Granhag and Leif Strömwall (eds.), The Detection of Deception in Forensic Contexts
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), 64-102; Vrij, Aldert, Detecting Lies and
Deceit: Pitfalls and Opportunities(Chichester: Wiley, 2008).
39 Colwell, Hiscock-Anisman and Fede, “Assessment criteria indicative of deception: An
example of the new paradigm of differential recall enhancement.”; Marcia Johnson, Mary Ann
Foley, Aurora Suengas and Carol Raye, “Phenomenal characteristics of memories for
perceived and imagined autobiographical events,” Journal of Experimental Psychology:
General 117 (1988): 371-376; Vrij, Detecting Lies and Deceit: Pitfalls and Opportunities.
40 Colwell, Hiscock-Anisman and Fede, “Assessment criteria indicative of deception: An
example of the new paradigm of differential recall enhancement.”;
Par Anders Granhag and Maria Hartwig, “The strategic use of evidence technique: A
conceptual overview,” in Par Anders Granhag, Aldert Vrij and Bruno Verschuere (eds.),
Detecting Deception Current Challenges and Cognitive Approaches (Chichester: WileyBlackwell, 2015), 231-251; Aldert Vrij, “A cognitive approach to lie detection,” in Par Anders
Granhag, Aldert Vrij and Bruno Verschuere (eds.), Detecting Deception Current Challenges
and Cognitive Approaches (Chichester: Wiley-Blackwell, 2015), 205-229.
41 Colwell, Hiscock-Anisman and Fede, “Assessment criteria indicative of deception: An
example of the new paradigm of differential recall enhancement.”
42 Ibid.
43 Maria Hartwig and Charles Bond, “Why do lie-catchers fail? A lens model meta-analysis of
human lie judgements,” Psychological Bulletin 137 (2011): 643-659.
44 Colwell, Hiscock-Anisman and Fede, “Assessment criteria indicative of deception: An
example of the new paradigm of differential recall enhancement.”
45 Ibid.
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percent deceptive) and has the potential to be applied across cultures.46
However, the ACID technique is limited when individuals are questioned about
their attitudes and intent, in uncovering concealed information, and when an
individual believes or is mistaken in what they are saying.47 Validation in applied
contexts is therefore required although research into its application to online
environments is emerging.48
Use of evidence to increase behavioral differences between truth-tellers and
deceivers has led to the development of strategic and tactical interviewing
approaches49. Strategic and tactical interviewing approaches attempt to counter
suspects’ strategies by enabling the process of free recall before a challenge phase
where varying strengths of evidence are presented which may highlight
inconsistencies within suspects’ accounts and between accounts and evidence.50
Tactical interviewing approaches are suggested to be more cognitively demanding
than strategic, potentially enabling greater behavioral differences between truthtellers and deceivers. 51 However, the contexts in which these approaches can be
usefully applied tend toward interviews concerning serious allegations where
planning and time can be used effectively by interviewers. The application of
such techniques in the online environment is presently unknown but appears to
have potential in dyadic interactions.
Cognitive approaches increase behavioral differences between liars and truthtellers through asking cognitively demanding and unanticipated questions to
circumvent deceivers’ preparations.52 Cognitively demanding questions focus on
reverse order recall and maintenance of eye contact whilst unanticipated
questions have focused on sketch drawing to enhance behavioral differences
between truth-tellers and liars.53 Although validation in applied settings is
required such techniques may be useful in uncovering verbal deception in
interaction whilst application to areas outside of conversational interaction and
other communication channels is more difficult to assess.

Ibid.
Ibid.
48 Ibid.
49 Coral Dando and Ray Bull, “Maximising opportunities to detect verbal deception: Training
police officers to interview tactically,” Journal of Investigative Psychology and Offender
Profiling 8 (2011): 189-202; Maria Hartwig, Par Anders Granhag, Leif Strömwall and Ola
Kronkvist, “Strategic use of evidence during police interviews: When training to detect
deception works,” Law and Human Behavior 30 (2006): 603-619.
50 Dando and Bull, “Maximising opportunities to detect verbal deception: Training police
officers to interview tactically,”; Granhag and Hartwig, “The strategic use of evidence
technique: A conceptual overview.”
51 Dando and Bull, “Maximising opportunities to detect verbal deception: Training police
officers to interview tactically.”
52 Vrij, “A cognitive approach to lie detection.”
53 Ibid.
46
47
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Forensic statement analysis examines narrative accounts of events though
focusing on response length, unique word count, and type-token ration (the ratio
of unique word count to response length).54 Current application of these
techniques has sought to identify differences between truth-tellers and deceivers
related to biological threats at both group and low-base rate conditions, which
more accurately reflect the reality of such threats.55 Forensic statement analysis
has further application to distinguishing genuine and deceptive eyewitness
accounts, including the input of false information.56 Examining the credibility of
claims is crucial in strategic environments as passively accepting presented
information may enable exploitation by the deceiver.
Linguistic techniques for analyzing behavioral differences between truth-tellers
and deceivers have focused upon analyzing narrative to understand underlying
thoughts, motives, and emotions across real world and mediated environments.57
Further, analysis of language change in online communication has enabled the
identification of cues to deceit, including potential cues to deception related to
insider threat and linguistic markers for radical violence.58 In linguistic patterns
in synchronous computer-mediated communication (CMC), deceivers may use a
greater number of words, sense-based words, and other-oriented pronouns and
use less self-oriented words when lying than when telling the truth.59 Increasing

Morgan, Colwell and Hazlett, “Efficacy of forensic statement analysis in distinguishing
truthful from deceptive eyewitness accounts of highly stressful events”; Morgan, Rabinowitz,
Hilts, Weller and Coric, “Efficacy of Modified Cognitive Interviewing, Compared to Human
Judgments in Detecting Deception Related to Bio-threat Activities”; Morgan, Rabinowitz,
Leidy and Coric, “Efficacy of combining interview techniques in detecting deception related
to bio-threat issues”; Morgan, Rabinowitz, Palin and Kennedy, “Who should you trust?
Discriminating genuine from deceptive eyewitness accounts.”
55 Morgan, Rabinowitz, Leidy and Coric, “Efficacy of combining interview techniques in
detecting deception related to bio-threat issues”; Morgan, Rabinowitz, Hilts, Weller and
Coric, “Efficacy of Modified Cognitive Interviewing, Compared to Human Judgments in
Detecting Deception Related to Bio-threat Activities.”
56 Morgan, Colwell and Hazlett, “Efficacy of forensic statement analysis in distinguishing
truthful from deceptive eyewitness accounts of highly stressful events”; Morgan, Rabinowitz,
Palin and Kennedy, “Who should you trust? Discriminating genuine from deceptive
eyewitness accounts.”
57 Newman, Pennebaker, Berry and Richards “Lying words: Predicting deception from
linguistic style”; Bond and Lee, “Language of lies in prison: Linguistic classification of
prisoners’ truthful and deceptive natural language.”
58 Hancock, Curry, Goorha and Woodworth, “On lying and being lied to: A linguistic analysis
of deception in computer-mediated communication”; Catalina Toma and Jeffrey Hancock,
“What lies beneath: The linguistic traces of deception in online dating profiles,” Journal of
Communication 62 (2012): 78-97; Lina Zhou, Judee Burgoon, Jay Nunamaker and Doug
Twitchell, “Automating linguistics-based cues for detecting deception in text-based
asynchronous computer-mediated communication,” Group Decision and Negotiation 13
(2004): 81-106; Paul Taylor, Coral Dando, Thomas Ormerod, Linden Ball, Marissa Jenkins,
Alexandra Sandham and Tarek Menacere, “Detecting insider threats through language
change,” Law and Human Behavior 37 (2013): 267-275; Katie Cohen, Fredrik Johansson,
Lisa Kaati and Jonas Mork, “Detecting linguistic markers for radical violence in social media,”
Terrorism and Political Violence 26 (2014): 246-256.
59 Hancock, Curry, Goorha and Woodworth, “On lying and being lied to: A linguistic analysis
of deception in computer-mediated communication.”
54
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the number of words may be used by deceivers to appear more credible or as a
strategy of distracting the receiver from inconsistencies in narrative, while other
tactics may involve the deceiver distancing themselves from their behavior.
Non-Verbal Deception Detection
Non-verbal approaches have focused upon detecting deception through
examining facial expressions, including micro-expressions and body language.60
However non-verbal cues are potentially rare and do not guarantee the presence
of deception. Furthermore, assigning such cues as being ‘deceptive’, as distinct
from idiosyncratic behavior or forms of arousal may lead to error. Although
discernible differences in facial expressions may be specific to high stake
environments such as appealing for the return of missing loved ones, an
awareness of the manifestation of genuine emotions is applicable to assessing
veracity in interpersonal and online domains.61
Micro-expressions are considered universal and comprise seven composite facial
expressions of particular emotional experience (happiness, surprise, sadness,
fear, disgust, contempt, and anger) that are argued to appear for less than a
quarter of a second and in a particular context may suggest that an individual is
deceiving.62 There is evidence for variations in the occurrence of facial
expressions, in particular, some expressions appearing in the upper or lower face,
some emotions appearing easier to fake than others, micro-expressions
presenting for longer than anticipated, occurring more in high intensity
emotional displays, appearing in truthful and deceptive accounts, and less
frequently than anticipated.63 It is argued that the context of an interaction and
its effect on an individual results in micro-expressions exposing true emotions;
however the impact of individual differences is largely unknown.
Ekman, Paul. Telling Lies: Clues to Deceit in the Marketplace, Politics and Marriage
(London: W.W Norton & Company, 2001); Bella DePaulo, James Lindsay, Brian Malone,
Laura Muhlenbruck, Kelly Charlton and Harris Cooper, “Cues to deception,” Psychological
Bulletin 129 (2003): 74-118.
61 Leanne ten Brinke, Sarah MacDonald, Stephen Porter and Brian O’Connor, “Crocodile
tears: Facial, verbal and body language behaviors associated with genuine and fabricated
remorse,” Law and Human Behavior 36 (2012): 51-59; Leanne ten Brinke and Stephen
Porter, “Cry me a river: Identifying the behavioural consequences of extremely high-stakes
interpersonal deception,” Law and Human Behavior 36 (2012): 469-477; Leanne ten Brinke,
Stephen Porter and Alysha Baker, “Darwin the detective: Observable facial muscles reveal
emotional high-stakes lies,” Evolution and Human Behavior 33 (2012) 411-416.
62 Ekman, Telling Lies: Clues to Deceit in the Marketplace, Politics and Marriage.
63 Stephen Porter and Leanne ten Brinke, “Reading between the lies: How do facial
expressions reveal concealed and fabricated emotions?,” Psychological Science 19 (2008):
508-514; Stephen Porter and Leanne ten Brinke, “The truth about lies: What works in
detecting high-stakes deception?,” Legal and Criminological Psychology 14 (2010): 119-134;
Stephen Porter, Leanne ten Brinke and Brendan Wallace, “Secrets and lies: Involuntary
leakage in deceptive facial expressions as a function of emotional intensity,” Journal of
Nonverbal Behavior 36 (2012): 23-37; ten Brinke, MacDonald, Porter and Brian O’Connor,
“Crocodile tears: Facial, verbal and body language behaviours associated with genuine and
fabricated remorse”; ten Brinke and Porter, “Cry me a river: Identifying the behavioural
consequences of extremely high-stakes interpersonal deception.”
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People may show discomfort when being interviewed and when engaging in
deception in the form of manipulators, and illustrators, although these behaviors
are not necessarily indicative of malign intent.64 Increased cognitive load may
lead to a reduction in illustrators which may make deceivers appear tense whilst
truth-tellers are likely to increase their illustrators to complement their
narrative.65 The greatest challenge in interpreting such findings is to identify the
extent to which they are applicable to non-student groups, for example, it is
unclear whether non-students exhibit greater or fewer illustrator cues to
deception.66 There is evidence that offenders may increase manipulators during
fabricated stories suggesting that deceivers’ usage of these behaviors is context
dependent or a strategy to distract from verbal content.67 Hence, the baseline of
truthful behavior in a particular context of interest has to be established before
judgements regarding deception can be made. Non-verbal deception detection
approaches have the potential to be used across real-world interactions and
mediated interactions where there is visual content, and suspicious behavior
based upon validated cues to deception may enable the identification of
individual for further monitoring.
Online Deception Detection
Online deception detection approaches examine online verbal and linguistic
content, features of the online environment that are used to make credibility
judgements, identifying links between an individual’s real world and online
persona and heuristics individuals rely on in credibility judgements.68 One
approach related to analyzing features is the so-called ‘Theory of Deception,’
where individuals are argued to detect deception by noticing and interpreting
anomalies in their environment through reference to the goals and aims ascribed
to interactional partners.69 In testing this approach, in conjunction with a real
website, a ‘hi-jacked’ website was created to replicate the real website and half the
Mark Frank, “Thoughts, feelings, and deception” in Brooke Harrington (ed.), Deception:
From Ancient Empires to Internet Dating (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2009), 55-73.
65 DePaulo, Lindsay, Malone, Muhlenbruck, Charlton and Cooper, “Cues to deception”; Frank,
“Thoughts, feelings, and deception”; ten Brinke and Porter, “Cry me a river: Identifying the
behavioural consequences of extremely high-stakes interpersonal deception”; Joe Navarro, “A
four-domain model for detecting deception,” FBI Law Enforcement Bulletin (June, 2003): 1924.
66 Porter and ten Brinke, “The truth about lies: What works in detecting high-stakes
deception?”
67 Stephen Porter, Laura England, Marcus Juodis, Leanne ten Brinke and Kevin Wilson, “Is the
face a window to the soul? Investigation of the accuracy of intuitive judgements of the
trustworthiness of human faces,” Canadian Journal of Behavioural Science 40 (2008): 171177.
68 See discussion of Verbal Deception Detection
69 Stefano Grazioli, “Where did they go wrong? An analysis of the failure of knowledgeable
internet consumers to detect deception over the internet,” Group Decision and Negotiation 13
(2004): 149-172; Paul Johnson, Stefono Grazioli, Karim Jamal and R. Glen Berryman,
“Detecting deception: Adversarial problem solving in a low base-rate world,” Cognitive
Science 25 (2001): 355-392.
64
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computer savvy sample was unknowingly directed to the ‘hi-jacked’ site.70 In
correctly identifying the deceptive site, individuals used fewer but more accurate
cues related to information assurance rather than trust and such strategies may
be used upon individuals’ knowledge and use of a communication format
alongside awareness of potential for deception online.71
Further development of ‘Theory of Deception’ argues that the recipient’s
individual disposition and perceptions are also vital for detecting cues to
deception.72 Disposition to trust and Web experience are influences on detecting
phishing, however computer self-efficacy, security knowledge, perceived risk, and
suspicion of humanity may not be strong predictors of detection.73 In detecting
phishing via email, there are two points of detection: The first point is before the
email is opened, where email authentication cues are salient and second after the
email is opened it becomes the only source of cues to deception.74 Once opened
there is an initial authentication of the email and perceived cues to deception
before suspicion is activated by the relationship between the cues, context and
individual factors.75 Individual factors include sensitivity to the value of
information, concern for privacy, obedience to authority and conscientiousness in
judgement, whilst contextual factors were linked to knowledge of the institution.
The third stage of deception detection involved individuals’ confirmation of
suspicion. The evaluation of the hypotheses was found to be related to two main
categories: confirmation seeking of authenticity and individual investigation of
authenticity.76
Prominence-Interpretation Theory (PIT) argues that individuals assess credibility
of websites through noticing features, judging them and then assigning
credibility.77 Assignation of prominence is affected by user involvement, website
content, the user task, user experience, and individual differences.78 User
assumptions, skills and knowledge, context and goals are argued to be linked to
the interpretation of features.79 Prominence-Interpretation Theory (PIT) focusses
on the content and interpretation of the user in assessing credibility of websites,
Grazioli, “Where did they go wrong? An analysis of the failure of knowledgeable internet
consumers to detect deception over the internet.”
71 Ibid.
72 Ryan Wright, Suranjan Chakraborty, Asli Basoglu and Kent Marett, “Where did they go
right? Understanding the deception in phishing communications,” Group Decision and
Negotiation 19 (2010): 391-416.
73 Ibid.
74 Ibid.
75 Ibid.
76 Ibid.
77 Fogg, BJ, “Prominence-interpretation theory: Explaining how people assess credibility,”
CHI ’03, Fort Lauderdale, Florida, April 5-10, 2003; Fogg, BJ, Cathy Soohoo, David
Danielson, Leslie Marable, Julianne Stanford and Ellen Yauber, “How do users evaluate the
credibility of web sites?: A study with over 2,500 participants,” DUX ’03, New York, New
York, 2003.
78 Ibid.
79 Ibid.
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however, it seems possible that individual may assess credibility in this manner in
other contexts including other forms of online content and has the potential for
expansion to face-to-face situations.
Individuals are argued to use different prominent features to assess credibility of
websites based upon the website context.80 For example, e-commerce sites are
judged according to their reputation and recognition, whilst news sites are judged
according to perceived bias of information, non-profit organizations are judged
according to their identity, and opinion/review sites are judged according to their
information bias and accuracy with further judgements informed by individuals
user experience.81 Knowledge of how individuals construct credibility of websites
based upon their features is important to understand, however, when dealing
with deception in strategic environments false online content may have plausible
features leading to inaccurate judgements of credibility.
When people are engaging in activities, including deception, depending on the
nature of the behavior there can be ‘warrants’, for example, organizational
credential’s in an email account or a profile photo in an online social network,
which enable links to be examined between an individual’s real-world and online
identities.82 Individuals may deceive more frequently in online chat
environments that enable greater anonymity, and less often in the use of email
where warrants are visible. The stakes of such interactions and the intent of the
deceiver are critical to ascertain in such situations, particularly those involving
criminal activities and breaches of security. Although examining warrants may be
a useful strategy for assessing credibility in low-stakes online interactions, in
high-stakes interactions this may be more troublesome where motivation,
resources and ability to manipulate identity may enable a convincing false
warrant’ to be displayed.
Uncovering hidden deception and malign intent across interpersonal and online
environments can include the identification of ‘digital footprints’, ‘digital
exhaust,’ or ‘scent trails’ that can be coupled with other forms of evidence such as
surveillance footage.83 Although rarely the focus of traditional deception
approaches, examining patterns of behavior, including email communications,
online statements and online searches of information about potential targets may
Fogg, Soohoo, Danielson, Marable, Stanford and Yauber, “How do users evaluate the
credibility of web sites?: A study with over 2,500 participants.”
81 Ibid.
82 Warkentin, Darcy, Michael Woodworth, Jeffrey Hancock and Nicole Cormier “Warrants
and deception in computer mediated communication,” CSCW, Savannah, Georgia, February
6-10, 2010.
83 Peter Forster, “Countering Individual Jihad: Perspectives on Nidal Hasan and Colleen
LaRose,” CTX 2 (2012): 1-11; Sandham, Alexandra, Thomas Ormerod, Coral Dando, Ray Bull,
M Jackson and J Goulding, “Scent trails: Countering terrorism through informed
surveillance,” Engineering Psychology and Cognitive Ergonomics – 9th International
Conference, Orlando, Florida, 2011.
80
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enable the identification of concealed actions.84 When drawing from tactical to
strategic level deception detection, a proactive stance is required, where potential
threats are monitored to ensure that information is collated and assessed for
deceit. Furthermore, there is potential for collected evidence to be later used in
investigative interviews with which to challenge suspects’ narratives.
Further understanding of how credibility judgements are made regarding online
content focuses upon construction of credibility, heuristics, and interaction, or
how such strategies amalgamate.85 The construct level examines how individuals
construct credibility, which in turn influences how they judge credibility.86 The
heuristics level involves judgement strategies that are used across multiple
contexts, whilst the interaction level focuses on judgements based upon source
and content cues.87 Heuristics identified from a U.S. sample include reputation,
endorsement, consistency, self-confirmation, expectancy violation, and
persuasive intent.88 Although there is difficulty in sorting heuristics into explicit
categories as processes may occur simultaneously in decision-making, and
contexts may generate multiple heuristics, alongside one heuristic activating
another.89 The interaction level focuses upon individuals’ interactions with a
website and neglects the online interactions that occur between individuals that
require credibility judgements that will be influenced by interpersonal dynamics.
Furthermore, the framework proposed does not focus upon the accuracy of
credibility judgements in identifying truth and deception.

Psychological Synthesis
To effectively understand and challenge the myriad forms of deception across
varying contexts and communication mediums, alongside identifying emerging
strategic deception there is a requirement for a synthesis of approaches. Such a
synthesis will incorporate multiple deception detection techniques that will be
tailored to reflect the context of the interaction, and it is acknowledged that not
all techniques will be relevant for all interactions. Where possible in-depth
analysis of the actors involved in deception should be conducted to understand
the culture and motives from which strategic deception will emerge, and enable
the identification of personalities that may present additional challenges to
practitioners. Intelligence, surveillance and evidence will aid practitioners once
sources and evidence have been verified for authenticity, they can enable the
identification of truth or deception by individuals, or where such evidence proves
Forster, “Countering individual Jihad: Perspectives on Nidal Hasan and Colleen LaRose”
Brian Hilligoss and Soo Young Rieh, “Developing a unifying framework for credibility
assessment: Construct, heuristics, and interaction in context,” Information Processing and
Management 44 (2008): 1467-1484.
86 Ibid.
87 Ibid.
88 Miriam Metzger, Andrew Flanagin and Ryan Medders, “Social and heuristic approaches to
credibility evaluation online,” Journal of Communication 60 (2010): 413-439.
89 Ibid.
84
85
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inconclusive it will provide further justification for the surveillance of individuals
of interest.90 Once individuals have been identified as deceptive or flagged for
further monitoring, social network analysis of these individuals should be
conducted to identify further threats and deception targeted at strategic interests.

Intelligence, Surveillance and Evidence
Intelligence, surveillance, and evidence play a crucial role in uncovering
deception by individuals and groups. Intelligence, surveillance, and evidence
techniques may be used to identify potential threats, uncover links between
individuals and groups, and contrast with individuals’ accounts to ensure
credibility. Intelligence and evidence can be used in investigative interviews to
elicit greater behavioral differences between truth-tellers and deceivers. Whilst
surveillance techniques can provide further monitoring of individuals who are
suspected of deception if there is no current evidence. However, caveats of these
techniques exist, as they are required to operate within the laws of the affected
nation, and sources of information alongside the content need to be verified for
credibility to ensure reliability of evidence.
There are varieties of forms of intelligence available to practitioners to assist them
in their analyses, whether in criminal, security and other strategic environments.
91 HUMINT, image intelligence (IMINT), signals intelligence (SIGINT), open
source intelligence (OSINT), and more recently social media intelligence
(SOCMINT) all enable practitioners to develop comprehensive accounts of
actions whether committed by an individual or a group.92 However, to ensure the
credibility of such intelligence requires verification of the source of information
through an approach tailored by the techniques outlined above, and of the
information, such source or communication channel provides. For example,
linguistic analysis techniques may be used to assess the credibility HUMINT,
OSINT and SOCMINT, whilst Subject Matter Experts (SMEs) may be used to
assess the reliability of IMINT and SIGINT. Once intelligence and evidence is
verified, it can then be used to assess the reliability of statements or used as
evidence to elicit behavioral differences between truth-tellers and deceivers.
Social network analysis however may be used to uncover links between actors and
identify where strategic deception may be emerging.93

Scott Schumate and Randy Borum, “Psychological support to defense counterintelligence
operations,” Military Psychology 18 (2006): 283-296.
91 Sir David Omand, Jamie Bartlett and Carl Miller, “Introducing social media intelligence
(SOCMINT),” Intelligence and National Security 27 (2012): 801-823.
92 Ibid.
93 Melonie Richet and Matthias Binz, “Open source collection methods for identifying radical
extremists using social media,” International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence
28 (2015): 347-364.
90
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Actors
To enhance understanding of deception an understanding of the individuals and
organizations involved in deception is required. Practitioners in operational
environments have readily accepted this premise, where enhanced understanding
of culture and elements of personality has been required across
counterintelligence.94 Understanding how individuals present themselves in
interactions has particular relevance to HUMINT interviews where gathered
intelligence can have large-scale ramifications if it is accepted as credible when it
is not.
The acceptance and likelihood of engaging in forms of deception may be based on
exclusive or multiple personality traits alongside the motive and context of
behavioral interactions.95 There are disorders related to deception, pathological
lying and instrumental gain that need to be considered by practitioners as
potential explanations for suspects’ motives and behavior and will present
additional challenges in detecting deception that affects strategic interests.
Psychopathy, Narcissism and Machiavellianism are three such personality
constructs that will present additional challenges for practitioners.96 Although
not all individuals will have such personalities, practitioners nevertheless still
require understanding of how such personalities manifest across individuals,
groups and communication mediums.
The impact of cultural differences on understanding deception is critical in the
globalized world. Deception is an evolutionary trait found in varying forms in
every culture in the world, although different cultures have different beliefs
regarding deception; for example, amongst Arabic people deception is acceptable
if an individual is seeking societal approval.97 When people are communicating in
different languages their ability to detect deception will be affected by language

Richet and Binz, “Open source collection methods for identifying radical extremists using
social media”; Schumate and Borum, “Psychological support to defense counterintelligence
operations.”
95 Beverley McLeod and Randy Genereux, “Predicting the acceptability and likelihood of lying:
The interaction of personality with type of lie,” Personality and Individual Differences 45
(2008): 591-596.
96 Taylor, Rachel, and Lynsey Gozna, Deception: A Young Person’s Life Skill? (Hove: The
Psychology Press, 2011); Cleckley, Hervey, The Mask of Sanity, (New York: Plume, 1982);
Hare, Robert, Psychopathy: Theory and Research, (New York: John Wiley, 1970); Robert
Raskin and Calvin Hall, “A narcissistic personality inventory,” Psychological Reports 45
(1979): 590; Christie, Richard and Florence Geis, Studies in Machiavellianism, (New York:
Academic Press, 1970).
97 Charles Bond and Sandhya Rao, “Lies travel: Mendacity in a mobile world,” in Par Anders
Granhag and Leif Strömwall (eds.), The Detection of Deception in Forensic Contexts
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), 127-141; Fayez Al-Simadi, “Detection of
deceptive behaviour: A cross-cultural test,” Social Behavior and Personality 28 (2000): 455462.
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and it is hard to analyze whether this will benefit the deceiver or the target.98
Cognitive load approaches to deception detection have also sought to detect
deception in those from other nations and cultures.99 ACID has been found to
detect deception in Arabic, Spanish, and English from a range of cultures and has
found similar impression management strategies in English and Chinese
speakers.100 Forensic statement analysis has further enabled discrimination
between truthful and deceptive Arabic speakers whilst forced-choice questioning
has also led to accurate identification of truthful and deceptive Russian and
Vietnamese speakers.101
The CHAMELEON Approach to Interviewing (CAI) is a personality led
investigative interview approach that takes into account a far wider breadth of
information than traditional investigative interview approaches.102 In dealing
with individuals, it is acknowledged that every offender/suspect has the potential
to be different from each other, to be different at different times, to behave
differently with different people, to behave differently across different actions
committed, to behave differently across different interviews, and to be different
within each interview.103 Individuals will have different backgrounds, life
experiences, attitudes, beliefs, offences, and modus operandi (MO). Each
individual has the potential to vary in his or her cognitive ability, his or her affect,
and his or her cooperativeness at different times. There will also be endogenous
and exogenous effects on an individual such that each will behave differently with
different interactional partners due to personal dynamics including, age, gender
and socio-economic status and previous experience with people and what are
Bond and Sandhya Rao, “Lies travel: Mendacity in a mobile world”; Keens Cheng, Hiu Wan
and Roderick Broadhurst, “The detection of deception: The effects of first and second
language on lie detection ability,” Psychiatry, Psychology and Law 12 (2005): 107-118.
99 Colwell, Hiscock-Anisman and Fede, “Assessment criteria indicative of deception: An
example of the new paradigm of differential recall enhancement.”; Charles Morgan and Gary
Hazlett, “Efficacy of forced-choice testing in detecting deception in Russian,” Journal of
Intelligence Community Research and Development (2009); Charles Morgan, Aaron
Mishara, John Christian and Gary Hazlett, “Detecting deception through automated analysis
of translated speech: Credibility assessments of Arabic-speaking interviewees,” Journal of
Intelligence Community Research and Development (2008): 1-22; Charles Morgan, Yaron
Rabinowitz, George Kallivrousis and Gary Hazlett, “Efficacy of automated forced-choice
testing dilemmas in detecting deception in Vietnamese,” Journal of Intelligence Community
Research and Development (2010): 1-11.
100 Colwell, Hiscock-Anisman and Fede, “Assessment criteria indicative of deception: An
example of the new paradigm of differential recall enhancement.”
101 Morgan, Mishara, Christian and Hazlett, “Detecting deception through automated analysis
of translated speech: Credibility assessments of Arabic-speaking interviewees”; Morgan and
Hazlett, “Efficacy of forced-choice testing in detecting deception in Russian”; Morgan,
Rabinowitz, Kallivrousis and Hazlett, “Efficacy of automated forced-choice testing dilemmas
in detecting deception in Vietnamese.”
102 Julian Boon and Lynsey Gozna, “Firing pea-shooters at elephants”, The Psychologist 22
(2009): 762-764; Lynsey Gozna and Julian Boon, “Interpersonal deception detection,” in
Jennifer Brown and Elizabeth Campbell (eds.), The Cambridge Handbook of Forensic
Psychology (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 484-491; Taylor and Gozna,
Deception: A Young Person’s Life Skill?
103 Boon and Gozna, “Firing pea-shooters at elephants”; Gozna and Boon, “Interpersonal
deception detection.”
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those people’s objectives. Each individual will be different within and across
interviews due to how penetrative questions are the subtlety of questions, and the
degree of incriminations as the interview progresses.

Application to a Multi-Incident Terrorist Scenario:
Across modern operating environments, scenarios have been used to increase
ability to respond to challenges posed by a variety of groups including, amongst
others, terrorist organizations. Following recent terrorist incidents in Western
nations including the failed Thalys train attack, the San Bernadino attack in the
United States, the recent multi-location attacks in Paris and Brussels, and the
resurgence of an active IRA, there is a need to develop complex scenarios.
Scenarios are used to highlight how such incidences may be countered through
understanding how multiple incidences of deception may enable a large-scale
attack, alongside the objectives of individuals and groups involved in such
activity. Scenario use for examining futures has been conducted across a wide
range of areas, including in strategic planning, management, and business, the
risk assessment and management of offenders, and in red-teaming terrorist
scenarios.104 Scenarios may be used as decision-making tools to overcome
limitations and enable preparation for the unexpected and the construction of
meaning from uncertainty and ambiguity through developing creative future
responses.105 Scenarios are socially constructed narratives, which integrate
Edwin Bakker, “Forecasting terrorism: The need for a more systematic approach,” Journal
of Strategic Security, 5 (2012): 69-84; DCDC, Global Strategic Trends – Out to 2040
(Swindon: DCDC, 2010a); DCDC, Future Character of Conflict (Swindon: DCDC, 2010b);
DCDC, Global Strategic Trends – Out to 2045 (Swindon: DCDC, 2014); Enid Mante-Meijer,
Patrick van der Duin and Muriel Abeln, “Fun with scenarios,” Long Range Planning 31
(1998): 628-637; Alex Wright, “The role of scenarios as prospective sensemaking devices,”
Management Decision 43 (2005): 86-101; Kevin Douglas, “Version 3 of the HistoricalClinical-Risk Management-20 (HCR-20 V3): Relevance to violence risk assessment and
management in forensic conditional release contexts,” Behavioral Sciences and the Law 2014
(32): 557-576; Stephen Hart and Caroline Logan, “Formulation of violence risk using
evidence-based assessments: The structured professional judgement approach” in Peter
Sturmey and Mary McMurran (eds.), Forensic Case Formulation (Chichester: Wiley
Blackwell, 2011); David Romyn and Mark Kebbell, “Terrorists’ planning of attacks: A
simulated ‘red-team’ investigation into decision-making,” Psychology, Crime & Law 2014
(20): 480-496
105 Muhammad Amer, Tugrul Daim and Antonie Jetter, “A review of scenario planning,”
Futures 46 (2013): 23-40; Frank Buytendijk, Toby Hatch and Pietro Micheli, “Scenario-based
strategy maps,”, Business Horizons 53 (2010): 335-347; Hugues De Jouvenel, “A brief
methodological guide to scenario building,” Technological Forecasting and Social Change 65
(2000): 37-48; Gary R. Bowman, Bradley MacKay, Swapnesh Masrani and Peter MacKiernan,
“Storytelling and the scenario process: Understanding success and failure,” Technological
Forecasting and Social Change 80 (2013): 735-748; Philippe Durance and Michel Godet,
“Scenario building: Uses and abuses,” Technological Forecasting and Social Change 77
(2010): 1488-1492; Jiří Fotr, Miroslav Špaček, Ivan Souček and Emil Vacík, “Scenarios, their
concept, elaboration and application,” Baltic Journal of Management 10 (2015): 73-97;
Michel Godet and Fabrice Roubelat, “Creating the future: The use and misuse of scenarios,”
Long Range Planning 29 (1996): 164-171; Sohail Inayatullah, “Six pillars: Futures thinking for
transforming,” Foresight 10 (2008): 4-21; Celeste Varum and Carla Melo, “Directions in
scenario planning literature – A review of the past decades,” Futures 42 (2010): 355-369;
Wright, “The role of scenarios as prospective sensemaking devices.”
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predetermined events with critical uncertainties to encourage future thinking and
are not predictions or forecasts of the future.106

Methodology
The explorative approach to scenario development is a qualitative approach
examining the structural uncertainty of futures to gain awareness and critical
insight.107 This approach has clearly defined goals, and the current research
focuses on a deception issues-based scenario to illustrate how multiple acts of
deception may be detected through multiple techniques for detecting deceit
through monitoring intelligence, surveillance and evidence alongside an
understanding of individuals’ personality, motive and mindset. 108 Qualitative or
narrative scenarios are considered appropriate for analysis of complex situations
where there are high levels of uncertainty as they enable greater flexibility in
adapting to threats and the scenario to be used to illustrate this approach falls
within this remit.109 Presented below is a scenario outlining a potential terrorist
incident across multiple sites and how such incidents may be detected through
tailored deception detection approaches.

The Scenario
A terrorist incident involving multiple actors in a capital city, for example,
London, occurs across multiple locations. The group involved is required to
conceal their true aims and motives and operate at a covert level during the
planning of their operations, including their target selection and preparation of
explosive devices and weapons and ammunition. Following the careful selection
of their targets, the group aims to create maximum confusion and distract
authorities from being able to respond effectively to the threats posed by them,
providing them a greater opportunity to achieve their aims. The initial target
selected for a mass casualty suicide-improvised explosive device (suicide-IED)
attack was a public shopping center with a large crowd of people, which would
create a large amount of media exposure for the group’s aims. A second key
suicide-IED attack location was a busy shopping street in the center of London. A
third location for an attack by suicide-IEDs using automatic weapons was a
cinema complex, whilst a fourth location was a popular restaurant. While these
attacks are aimed to occur over a short space of time to reduce the emergency
services effectiveness in responding to this threat, small explosive devices were
also planted at multiple locations around London. These devices were designed
to create attention and panic amongst members of the public and draw
Wright, Alex “The role of scenarios as prospective sensemaking devices”
Lena Börjeson, Mattias Höjer, Karl-Henrik Dreborg, Tomas Ekval and Göran Finnveden,
“Scenario types and techniques: Towards a user’s guide,” Futures 38 (2006): 723-739; Philip
Van Notten, Jan Rotmans, Marjolein van Asselt and Dale Rothman, “An updated scenario
typology,” Futures 35 (2003): 423-443.
108 Van Notten, Rotmans, Asselt and Rothman, “An updated scenario typology”.
109 Ibid.
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emergency service responses away from the actual intended targets. These
devices were also planted across a range of locations, which did not actually
reflect the aims, or ideology of the group made it harder to ascertain the groups’
aims.

Methods of Detection
Intelligence derived from HUMINT, IMINT and SIGINT may be used to identify
suspects during the planning stages of the attack. Such identification may occur
during target surveillance where individuals may be seen across multiple
locations and their non-verbal behavior assessed for potential cues indicative of
deceit or concealed intent. Such analysis may be combined with SIGINT where
communication between suspected terrorists may be intercepted and analyzed
according to linguistic approaches to deception detection and online credibility
assessment perspectives. Further, surveillance may identify suspects who are
buying materials being used to manufacture explosive devices.
If suspects are intercepted based upon evidence generated from intelligence and
surveillance approaches, then further HUMINT may be developed from the use of
interviewing techniques. Verbal and non-verbal deception detection techniques
can be employed to assess credibility in suspects and compare and contrast their
statements with evidence generated from IMINT and SIGINT. In interactions
with the suspects, it is important to understand how their beliefs will inform their
actions and interview strategies will need to be tailored accordingly. If nonverbal behaviors indicative of deceit are encountered during suspect interviews,
suspect’s non-verbal behaviors will provide useful guides for practitioner to
question further.
In the event that the suspected terrorists are not intercepted, then the terrorist
attack may occur and a different approach to deception detection will be required.
Surveillance from IMINT sources including CCTV cameras will provide evidence
of where each explosion occurs. To minimize casualties, authorities require an
effective emergency response where they can distinguish between genuine and
distraction explosions. The use of SMEs in identifying the differences between
the genuine and distraction explosions will enable the emergency services to
allocate their resources effectively potentially reducing the number of casualties.
While techniques related to pre-detection and alternative analyses, may enable a
more robust response to the threats posed by anticipating the likelihood of an
adversary course of action. If the course of an action is more likely to be
anticipated, then it may be prevented or detected before the threat occurs.

Conclusion
The current article highlighted a range of techniques that may be used towards
detecting deception and applying such techniques whilst keeping an open mind
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towards the possibilities of a larger deception may prove useful in detecting
strategic deception. To illustrate how a tailored approach to deception detection
may be deployed against multiple threats a scenario involving a terrorist attack
was outlined alongside potential strategies of how to detect deception at different
points across the scenario. While such an approach enables the ability to
envisage new approaches to deception detection for practitioners, the approach to
deception detection combining behavioral cues to deceit alongside a
consideration of personality and motive will require validation both in
experimental and real-world conditions. The list of techniques discussed is not
exhaustive and it is anticipated that many techniques will be refined over time to
produce greater accuracy in deception detection. One key point to note is that
deceptive behavior is not generic and attempts at deception will reflect the
surrounding aims, culture, and personalities of those individuals involved in
large-scale deception and this will differ accordingly between and within
organizations involved in committing deception for strategic gain.
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